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The Missed Dialogues of the
Euro-Turkish Relationships
Juliette Tolay
This paper attempts to assess the state ofdialogue between Europe
and Turkey. Using Thomas Risse's application of Habermas'
theory of communicative action, it covers and analyzes four
opportunity spaces for dialogue: the European Union-Turkish
institutional relationship, the bilateral diplomatic relationships
between European countries and Turkey, Turkish immigration
to Europe, and European tourism in Turkey. Overall, most
communicative interaction between Europe and Turkey is
done under the logic of appropriateness (rule-guided behavior)
as opposed to the logic of consequentialism (interest-guided
behavior) or the logic of arguing (reasoning-guided behavior).
As interactions remain superficial and one-sided, they merely
are «missed dialogues:'
Introduction
The idea of dialogue among civilizations has been recently revitalized as a
potential remedy against the perceived clash of civilizations, as well as reaffirmed
as an ethical and efficient way of approaching intercultural cooperation and
mutual understanding. Among this general civilizational dialogue, the particular
relationship between Europe and Turkey is considered as critical for the future of
Europe, the future of the Muslim world, as well as the future ofthe broader West/
Islam relationship.
The relationship between Europe and Turkey is strategically very important
at the juncture of political, security, and economic i~terests of many important
world actors. The United States has an invested interest in the success ofTurkish
accession to the European Union, even though the United States strives not
to be too vocal about it. The European Union is facing deep challenges when
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confronting the issue of Turkey's membership, which affects the very nature
and meaning of the European Union project. The Muslim world is looking at
the Turko-European relationship with curiosity and anxiety, as they consider
it a test of the sincerity-or the hypocrisy-of the European discourse. Turkey
is also self-aware of the 'importance of this relationship. Besides keeping the
EU accession negotiations at the top of the political agenda, Turkey also takes
seriously its role as a promoter of dialogue, illustrated by its 2005 initiative-in
cooperation with Spain-of creating an Alliance of Civilizations, under the
auspices of the United Nations (www.unaoc.org). The European Union is also
granting significant consideration to the need for dialogue, as the dialogu~with
Turkey figured at the core of the initiative of European Year of Intercultural
Dialogue 2008 (www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu), at the core ofthe declaration
of a «Turkish season in France" for 2009 and 2010 (www.saisondelaturquie.fr).
and at the core of the European Union's decision to choose Istanbul as the 2010
European Capital of Culture (www.en.istanbuI2010.org/index.htm).
But this emphasis on dialogue retains an ambiguous character. At a
philosophical and theoretical level, the importance of dialogue is affirmed and
demonstrated. Authors from Gadamer to Habermas, from Thomas Risse to
Jacques Derrida, have emphasized the benefits and the workings of the use of
dialogue to improve on relationships. However, within circles ofpolitical science
and studies of international relations, dialogue between different political
actors is largely ignor~d as a politically significant factor. 1 Rather it is largely
seen as a procedural matter, that does not affect the ways political, security,
and economic interests of actors emerge and interact. As such, the activities
of «dialogue" in which different actors in Europe and in Turkey engage are
not considered worth consideration for scholars of political science. And when
some scholars recognize value to dialogue, they dismiss it as endeavors that are
too general, broad, and abstract endeavors to be easily grasped, hence studied
and evaluated scientifically.
In this paper, I address this skepticism. The underlying assumption of
this paper is that, in principle, dialogue can have an important political
impact. The reason why dialogue is often disregarded is because when it is
successful, the focus is kept on the successful outcome and not on the process
of dialogue. And when it fails, then dialogue is dismissed as being useless. On
the contrary, I argue that dialogue matters especially when it is unsuccessful,
as it constrains and limits the possibility of positive outcome. It is therefore
necessary to understand how dialogue works and why it fails. Consequently,
I propose a way of studying dialogue, by focusing on opportunity spaces-
which are instances of extended contact where dialogue could take place-and
analyzing the rules and mechanisms that apply in each of these spaces. To
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evaluate in practice the failure and success of different forms of dialogue, I
apply the three logics of social actions: the logic of consequentialism, the logic
of appropriateness, and the logic of arguing. More specifically in the context of
the Euro-Turkish relationship, four different spaces are analyzed: the European
Union-Turkish institutional relationship, the bilateral diplomatic relationships
between European countries and Turkey, Turkish immigration into Europe,
and European tourism in Turkey. All of these spaces, bringing together people
of both sides, provide opportunities for exchange and dialogue.
The overall tonality of this argument is highly suggestive. It suggests a
new way to look at the relationship between Europe and Turkey, a new way
to understand dialogue in international relations and a new way to uncover
expressions of the logic of appropriateness. However, more research in the
future should be done to confirm or infirm the following conclusions.
Defining Dialogue and Missed Dialogues
The notion of dialogue is often conceived as being something positiv~ and
laudable. The practice of dialogue seems to be engrained in human nature
and most people tend to capture intuitively how dialogue can lead to positive
outcomes. However, few people actually understand and explain how dialogue
is supposed to bring about the expected positive changes. Three complementary
types of explanation-the knowledge-adjustment approach, the constructivist/
transformative approach, and the critical approach-can help understand the
linkages between dialogue and outcomes.
What I refer to as the knowledge-adjustment approach is best represented
by the works of Gadamer and Habermas. For Gadamer, conversation is the
only means to achieve a consensual agreement: «Conversation is a process
of two people understanding each other... The thing that has to be grasped
is the objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion, so that they can agree
with each other on a subject" (1979, p. 894). Conversely, Habermas sees
communication, by the use of reason in the public sphere, as the source of
agreement and common ground, which in turns advances understanding and
human well-being. Habermas is however also aware of the difficult conditions
required for genuine communication, which he calls «ideal-speech situation"
(1984). Defection in communication is considered by Habermas as the main
cause of violence in the international arena; opening ways to true dialogue
and to «mutual perspective-taking" would therefore resume more harmonious
relationships (Borradori, Habermas & Derrida, 2003, pp. 64-65).
Beyond the idea of dialogue to find stable and fair agreements between
different parties, a branch of constructivist theory has highlighted the power
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of ideational forces. The constructivist/transformative approach goes beyond
the idea of learning and adapting its position to the positions of the other, but
rather emphasizes the transformative nature of dialogue: people change not
only their views of others, but they change their very normative frameworks.
Finnemore and Sikkink affirm "in an ideational international structure, idea
shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation" ( 1998,
p. 894). Thus dialogue might lead to new norms which might construe a more
democratic, peaceful, and just world. Here again, dialogue exhibits a great
potentiality for change, but the conditions under which such a transformative
power can be exerted remain not fully understood or difficult, which is what
the constructivist school of international relations is focusing on.
Derrida goes further in analyzing dialogue's potentiality to lead to change.
For Derrida, dialogue opens "the possibility to think and to think differently"2
(Cherif & Derrida, 2006, p. 80). Even though Derrida is suspicious overall
of language, he believes in the human ability to deconstruct language and
discourses and, as such, to introduce an essential critique and contestation.
This critique, practiced by dialogue and communication, is at the core of his
concept of «democracy to come:' Democracy, for Derrida, is an ideal that can
never be fully reached, but «democracy-to-come" is a process of auto-critique,
contestation, and acceptation of contestation and perfectibility that opens up
the possibility of a future democracy (Cherif & Derrida, 2006, p. 69). The main
point for Derrida is the possibility through dialogue to deconstruct existing
word-norm-behavior nexus and be open to alternatives.
There are therefore three main complementary channels through which
dialogue can lead to better mutual understanding and common ground:
reaching. agreements on practices and knowledge, transformation of the
normative structure, and continuous critical stances. The main problem of
these three channels is that they exist as a potentiality, but are never engaged
systematically in any type of dialogue.
These approaches to dialogue indeed highlight some of the conditions
necessary for a true dialogue to take place. As mentioned earlier, Habermas
coined the term «ideal-speech situation" to refer to the set of conditions needed
for dialogue. Risse summarizes the «ideal-speech situation" as follows. First,
it «requires the ability to empathize, that is, to see things through the eyes of
one's interaction partner" (Risse, 2000, p. 11). «Second, actors need to share a
«commonlifeworld" (gemeinsameLebenswelt), asupplyofcollective interpretations
of the world and of themselves, as provided by language, a common history,
or culture" (Risse, 2000, p. 11). «Finally, actors need to recognize each other
as equals and have equal access to the discourse, which must also be open to
other participants and be public in nature" (Risse, 2000, p. 11).3 Habermas has
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been criticized for conditioning the possibility to communicate to unrealistic
preconditions. However, this ((ideal-speech situation" should be taken as an
ideal-typical category, which does not exist in reality,~but helps identify the
strength and weaknesses of particular interactive settings. Still, the criticism
holds that conditions of real dialogue are overall difficult to meet.
It seems indeed rather easy to mistake some forms of interactions and
exchange of words for real dialogue. It is therefore necessary to distinguish
between ccgenuine" dialogue and ccmissed dialogue:' Le. situations of
communicative interaction where there is an appearance of dialogue but
no real practice of dialogue. The debates that opposed rationalist and social
constructivists on the modes of social action and interaction can h~lp here
understand the rationale behind ccmissed dialogue:' March and Olsen, in their
1989 book, distinguished between two forms of logic underlying social action,
which relate to two different forms of rationality: the logic of consequentialism
and the logic ofappropriateness (Checkel, 2001; March & Olsen, 1989, 1998). The
logic of consequentialism is the traditional realm of rational choice approaches
and is the result of the practice of instrumental rationality. Under the logic of
consequentialism, agents engaged in strategic interaction ccparticipate on the
basis of their given identities and interests and try to realize their preferences
through strategic behavior" (Risse, 2000, p. 3). On the other side, agents operating
under the logic ofappropriateness do not attempt to maximize their preferences;
rather they try to do the CCright thing:' The logic of appropriateness therefore
assumes that actors associate particular identities to particular situation, and
associate particular norms to particular behavior. Consequently, actors behave
so as to fulfill their norms and identities (Risse, 2000, p~ 4).
Thomas Risse, applying the insights of Habermas to international relations,
identifies a third type of logic of social action and interaction, namely the logic
ofarguing. He argues that under the logic of arguing, agents engage in cctruth-
seeking:' Such truth-seeking occurs when CCdoing the right thing" (logic of
appropriateness) is impaired by the existence of simultaneous conflicting rules
or norms. In this case, actors need to argue regarding which norm should apply
(Risse, 2000,p. 6).
As Risse points out, these three logics of social action are not mutually
exclusive; rather most human actions are characterized by a mix of the three
logics. However, as ideal-types, they help understand the types of missed
dialogues and their underlying rationale. The logic of consequentialism and the
logic ofappropriateness can indeed characterize two forms ofmissed dialogues,
whereas the logic of arguing is the one underlying genuine dialogue. In a
situation ofcommunicative interaction dominated by the logic ofconsequentialism,
the actors' interests are given and fixed and actors simply attempt to maximize
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their preferences; actors may engage in rhetorical devices to try to alter the other
parties' interests, but without being ready to change their own interest; or they
may simply apply different forms of pressure on the other party. In this case,
there is no real dialogue because the actors are not taking into consideration
the position of the other, but rather engage in instrumental behavior.
Interactions under the logic ofappropriateness can be more consensual, but
as coercive as the ones under the logic of consequentialism. Under the logic
of appropriateness, there is no need for much discussion: this time interests
can be negotiated but identities and norms are fixed and there is a consensus
regarding what needs to be done. Given the situation, the identities of the
parties and the normative framework, the actions to take and decisions to make
are pre-determined even before the interaction. Only when the logic ofarguing
prevails can there be a real situation of dialogue. In this case, actors can engage
in real «mutual-perspective taking" and real forms of argumentation can take
place to decide which interpretation of the problem>-is the most appropriate, as
well as which solution is the most fair. The key distinction between genuine and
missed dialogues is the extent to which both partners in the dialogue are ready
to accept change on their own side if the outcome of the dialogue commands
so. With these different forms of dialogue and missed dialogue in mind, the
remainder of this paper attempts to evaluate the types of dialogue that are
taking place between Europe and Turkey.
Four Spaces of Dialogue between Turkey and Europe
To evaluate the type of communicative interaction in which Europe and Turkey
are engaged, the concept of opportunity space is used to refer to instances of
interaction between Europe and Turkey that seem structurally favorable to
dialogue and where one can expect dialogue to take place. Two spaces that are
covered below represent classical cases of diplomatic relationship: one is the
institutional relationship that Turkey has with the European Union, especially
under Turkey's accession negotiations; the other one covers the bilateral
political relationships between individual European countries and Turkey,
Le. the more traditional diplomatic bilateral relationships. The other two
spaces reviewed here are places where large-scale interaction occurs between
Turkish and European actors even though these are not considered traditional
cases of diplomacy. As will be shown, however, these places of interactions,
namely Turkish immigration to Europe and European tourism in Turkey, have
important political and diplomatic implications and hold a central place in the
overall dialogue between Europe and Turkey. The findings presented below
build mainly on the existing literature of these four different areas. My goal
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here is mainly to reframe these findings so as to evaluate the nature of dialogue
between Europe and Turkey in the four areas identified, and highlight which
logic of social action is dominant in each area.
The Institutional European Union- Turkey relationship
The relationship between Turkey and the European Union is a very dense and
complex relationship which dates back to 1959 when Turkey applied for an
associate membership to the then European Economic Community. While
the European Union officially recognized Turkey as a member candidate in
1999 and opened accession negotiations in 2004, Turkey's relationship with
the European Union is also characterized by serious challenges. Given the
high expectations and numerous obstacles that this relationship faces, one
might expect a great deal of dialogue between the two parties so as to come
up with creative and beneficial solutions for both parties. The multiple facets
and complexity of the relationship cannot be assessed here in a couple of lines;
rather, I focus on two particular features of this relationship, namely the process
of accession negotiations and the discourse made about this process.
The European Union's enlargement also has a long history and, over
the decades, the European Union has established an institutionalized process
through which candidate countries have to go. In short, it consists mainly
in, first~ satisfying the «Copenhagen Criteria" so as to becolpe eligible, and,
second, once the negotiations are open, in adopting the C(acquis communautaire."
The Copenhagen criteria, decided in the 1993 European Council, stated three
sets of criteria that need to be met: the political criterion, which call for a
commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect, and
protection of minorities; the economic criterion, which requires a functioning
market economy; and the legislative criterion, which requires the countries'
commitment to the adoptions of the laws, rules, and norms of the European
Union. The technical aspect of this legislative criterion comes with the actual
adoption of the acquis communautaire during the negotiation phase. The acquis
communautaire refers to the total body ofEU laws that have accumulated over the
years. Given the impressive size of the acquis and the complexity of the adoption
of such a large number of rules for the candidate country, the acquis is divided
into chapters (35 in the case of Turkey) and it takes a couple of years for the
country to actually adopt and implement these new measures.4 The interesting
part of this process is that in the big picture, neither the Copenhagen criteria,
nor the acquis is negotiable. This is easily explained by the nature ofthe European
political and institutional project: new countries joining the European Union
are not creating a new polity; rather they are joining an existing polity to which
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they should comply. However, in terms of dialogue between the European
Union and Turkey, it means that the only things that can be subject to dialogue
is the timing of the adoption of the acquis, not the content. This basic fact, often
overlooked in daily discussions over the European Union, is a core element
in the relationship between the European Union and Turkey, which shrinks,
almost nullifies, the scope of dialogue.
Interestingly however, the European side actually uses the term of dialogue
with Turkey in their discourse to characterize their relationship with Turkey.
Even though «dialogue" can only lead to change on the Turkish side, but no
change (in discourse, action, and identity) on the European side, leaders from
the European Union oftentimes emphasize the importance and central role
that dialogue play for smooth negotiations. One example here can illustrate
this last point. On May 27, 2008, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement made
a speech at the European Union-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. The
title of the speech was «EU and Turkey: Constructive dialogue and a spirit of
compromise are key for the accession process:' Quite bluntly, the title seems to
indicate the willingness and hope of the European side to engage in a dialogue
with Turkey. And indeed, the commissioner goes on to say, «The history of
past enlargements shows that constructive dialogue and a spirit of compromise
are key for the accession process to succeed" (EJ] and Turkey, 2008). But
the following sentence reads as follows: «During our recent visit to Turkey,
President Barroso urged both government and opposition parties to engage in dialogue,
and to seek compromise on the sensitive issues dominating the domestic
debate" (emphasis added, EU and Turkey, 2008). So, the actual dialogue that
the commissioner is talking about is not one between Europe and Turkey, but
rather between different parties within the Turkish domestic landscape. And
the speech goes on to say, «The Negotiating Framework spells out these values,
and it is the Commission's duty to monitor them. The Commission's role in the
accession process can be described as the friend who tells the truth-even if the
truth is sometimes unwelcome in parts of the EU or Turkey"5 (emphasis added,
EU and Turkey, 2008). From these lines, it seems indeed that the European
Union does not need to engage in dialogue, because it already knows the truth,
so the European Union is simply helping the other parties to have dialogue
among themselves, with the European Union showing the way and telling the
truth. Other similar examples could be provided,6 as this tendency to talk about
dialogue, but to expect change only from the Turkish side seems to be pervasive
in the European Union-Turkey relationship.
This speech is symptomatic ofa bigger problem that characterizes European
Union's behavior towards Turkey (and other third countries as well for that
matter): the European Union regards itself as a model, a superior normative
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construct that cannot be challenged, or rather that can only be challenged
internally by existing members, but not by non-members, whose position
as candidate, i.e. "in-demand" towards the European Union, indicates their
inferiority. As analyzed by Yannis Stivachtis, among others, the whole system of
membership conditionality of the European Union is replicating the "standard
of civilization" which was applied in the 19th century to decide which country
could belong to the International Society (Stivachtis, 2008). It reproduces
implicitly the 19th century understanding that there are no "civilizations" but
rather that there is only one civilization, i.e. one normative model to which
others should comply to be accepted as an equal partner. This oftentimes
unconscious but pervasive understanding is also strengthened by the fact that
many Turkish parties actually agree on the fact that the European Union presents
a superior model, hence reinforcing the European feeling of superiority. This
analysis does not mean that the European Union is "bad;' or that Turkey should
disagree with the European Union for the sake of dialogue. Rather, it simply
highlights the fact that this situation is rendering genuine dialogue impossible
or meaningless: the underlying discourse ofr-'the superiority of the European
Union's model is covering the entire relationship with a heavy normati~e veil,
which makes it difficult to be critical on some issues and hence undermines
dialogue. Instead, it seems that the European Union-Turkish relationship tends
to be a missed dialogue characterized by the logic of appropriateness" where
it is overall appropriate to follow the European Union: this appears to be the
"right thing" to do. The internalization of the norm that the European Union
presents a desirable model ensures some levels of compliance from Turkey
and eschews possibilities for dialogue (Checkel, 2001; Diez, Agnantopoulos &
Kaliber, 2005).
The bilateral relationships with European countries
Turkey's bilateral relationships with individual European countries also
suffer from similar problems, although the structure for dialogue is different.
For one thing, there are a couple of particular issues-such as the issue of the
Armenian "genocide/events of 1915" in the relationship with France, the Turk-
ish Diaspora in the relationship with Germany, or historical neighboring issues
with Greece-that often sets the tonality of individual bilateral relationships.
But overall, the question of Turkish accession to the European Union remains
the main issue at stake in bilateral relationships. In the framework of the EU-
Turkey institutional relations, Turkey's accession is a technical issue (depending
on the quality and pace of the adoption of the acquis); but in bilateral relations,
Turkey's membership to the European Union is a political issue. Some countries
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such as France, Austria, and Italy, have mentioned the possibility to submit the
final decision over Turkey's membership to a national referendum, even if the
European Commission has already approved Turkey's accession. Even though
such referendum would only happen at the end of the negotiation process,
which is not expected before 2015 (in the most optimistic, already unrealistic
views), these statements create an uncomfortable situation of tension and un-
certainty. Moreover, if other countries have not expressed their willingness to
condition Turkey's accession to a referendum, being for or against the member-
ship of Turkey has become an important political position to take for political
parties and politicians all over Europe (Akagiil & Vaner, 2005).
The question of Turkey's membership, however, does not seem to be a
source of dialogue between Turkey and European countries. This issue is in-
deed more conceived as a domestic political issue, rather than a foreign politi-
cal issue. On the one hand, the issue of Turkey's membership raises an internal
political debate in Europe questioning the identity and values underlying the
European Union project. On the other hand, Turkey's membership is creating
unique political polarization in individual countries, such as France, Austria,
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, etc. Consequently, most of the dialogue
is taking place inside domestic constituencies, with leaders mainly concerned
by voters' opinion and with domestic groups being the main framers of the
issue. Here, as democratic theory would expect, the structure of elections and
political leaders' dependency on public opinion greatly reduces the room of
maneuver for dialogue. Turkish counterparts are, for the most part, excluded
from these debates. European political leaders undergo some forms of adjust-
ments, but only so as to satisfy public opinion while addressing their political
agenda, and not through interactions with Turkish partners.
Interestingly, scholars of communicative interactions have made the point
that the development of telecommunication technology and the replacement
of secretive diplomacy by public diplomacy have open the door for sounder
argumentation and less interested behavior in international relations (Lynch,
2000; Risse, 2000). The argument goes that, as decision makers have to justify
their actions and decisions to a broader public encompassing diverse interests,
they have to use public reason to provide a rationale acceptable to their audi-
ence. However, the relations between Turkey and European countries outlined
above seem to indicate a reverse trend. In this case, it seems that the effect
of public opinion on the way diplomacy is conducted reduces the possibility
of dialogue. Indeed, when decision makers have to persuade their audience,
they also become tied to this audience. And this tie between public/voters and
decision makers reduces the scope of dialogue between the two countries. If
there is a lack of conflicting and competing views within public opinion, then
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domestic dialogue prevents international dialogue. Using Putnam's two-level
game theory, the fewer margins the negotiator has at the domestic table, the less
dialogue can occur at the international table (1988). In any case, the possibility
of real dialogue between Turkey and individual countries is st\rongly impaired
by political leaders' strict reliance on their electorate. Here again, the logic of
appropriateness prevails as European leaders are locked in their necessity to do
the ((right thing:' the right thing being defined by the norms held by their elec-
torate. At that level again, it seems that Euro-Turkish diplomatic relationships
are not naturally conduci,:e to dialogue and mainly lead to missed dialogues.
This also means that there is overall an important need to better under-
stand the position that different societies hold toward one another-here the
Turkish and European societies-as well as understand the sources of these
positions/attitudes.
Turkish immigration into Europe
Immigration, and especially the large numbers of Turkish migrants and
ccEuropean citizens ofTurkish origins" living in several European countries, is a
good place to test the possibility ofdialogue between two societies. Immigration
started in the 1960s, with the establishment of temporary workers program in
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Austria, France, etc., when hundreds
of thousands of Turkish workers immigrated to Western Europe. Even though
considered mainly as a temporary phenomenon, by the 1980s the awareness
that the Turkish populations were settling and would probably remain in
Europe appeared incrementally (Kaya & Kentel, 2005; Vaner, 2005, pp. 555-
577). Since then, much has been said about Turkish migration to and Turkish
migrants in Europe. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, in their study of Euro-
Turks, have emphasized the potential for bridging the two cultures (Turkish
and European) that some Turkish migrants' communities in Europe can fulfill
(2005). In this space of migration, the question of whether dialogue is taking
place relies on the issue of integration: how much are the migrant populations
in contact, involved, accepted, and how does the integration take place, are
central questions to understand dialogue.
Schematically and by oversimplifying, there are two main models of
integration of migrants' communities that have been distinguished '-by the
migration literature and tried re'spectively in France-the assimilationist
(or universalist) model-and in UK and Germany-the communitarian (or
differentialist) model (Kaya & Kentel, 2005; Schnapper, 1992; Todd, 1997).
The republican assimilationist model as practiced in France emphasizes
the idea that the only way to become integrated in the French society is to
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become French, i.e. to buy into the republican ideal of being French (a mix
of political and social values, knowledge of French language and history, and
a particular way of life). This "becoming French" is open to everyone with, in
theory, no distinction of race, ethnicity, language, physical appearances, etc.
This openness to "becoming French" is counter-balanced by the requirement
for the migrant to actually forget his or her cultural difference so as to blend in
the French project. There is indeed no possibility for the migrants to question
or challenge or slightly alter the fixed definition of "being French:' In a way,
this assimilationist model resembles the EU process of accession, where one
can either fully adopt or not the other's identity, but without room to discuss
and negotiate the content of what is adopted. The underlying assumption
of the assimilationist model is that the Republican understanding of «being
French" is a universal model, most likely seen as the best model, and that it
cannot apriori be perfected, especially not by foreigners. This model has had its
success, as well as worrisome failures, and has been followed by many migrants,
including Turkish migrants who became French. But in this model there is
no real dialogue taking place. While Turkish parties have the opportunity to
be transformed, the French side is not learning anything about Turkey, and is
neither engaged in much of a transformative experience. The French parties
also get artificially confirmed of the validity of its model.
The alternative model, practiced with strong nuances in Germany and the
United Kingdom, is the communitarian model. Contrary to the assimilationist,
the communitarian model accepts and gives room to differences. It strives for a
multicultural society. Each community can exert its own culture in cohabitation
with other cultures. This more tolerant model has, however, one main problem:
it is only "tolerant" instead of being inclusive. And it often raises barriers
between communities, practically suppressing the possibility of cultural blend,
or the possibility of «becoming English" or "becoming German:' In this case
as well, even though for different reasons, there is no real dialogue possibly
taking place: dialogue is considered not necessary and even useless given the
perceived inaccessibility of the other, the impossibility to empathize, or take the
perspective of the other.
The constraints created by the modalities of integration in Europe therefore
create an unfavorable environment for dialogue. Many other factors, such as
sociological constraints, geographical and social segregation, translation of
languages, and cognitive framework, add to the difficulty to communicate.
Some positive elements are also present, such as the existence of local dialogue
initiatives, of interfaith or intercultural nature. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel
present a more optimist picture by showing how the majority of Turkish
populations in Europe "have become permanent settlers, active social agents
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and decision-makers" (2005, p. 3). However, it is not clear ifthese success stories
led to dialogue or simply adaptation from one side only. Overall, the problem
remains that once again, the only possible dialogue between Turkey and Europe
is a one-way type ofdialogue, hence a missed dialogue, where it is expected that
change can only occur on the Turkish side. The belief on the European side,
that the existing national identities are better creates a normative model, where
real dialogue is excluded and the logic of appropriateness prevails.
European Tourism in Turkey
Finally, the last space where we will envision dialogue between Turkey and Europe
is the symmetrical but unequal equivalent of Turkish migration to Europe:
European tourism in Turkey. With estimates of te.ns of millions of tourists each
year, tourism holds a very important position in Turkish economy, and, although
it became more diversified these last years, tourism relies strongly on European
tourists, mainly from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany.
The large-scale number of tourists coming to Turkey and the industry that it
has created over the last years led to a highly professionalized sector. One might
indeed expect that such important numbers of contacts might be propitious to
sustained dialogue. The field of sociology of tourism that developed in the 1980s
onwards, and the findings made about the Turkish touristic system can help
assess the type of interaction that occurs between tourists and locals (Cohen,
1984; Kozak & Tasci, 2005; Sonmez & Sirakaya, 2002).
The findings of this literature seem to indicate that overall tourism has
a rather important effect on the local society and to some extent on the tourists.
However, especially in "mature" tourist systems such as Turkey, genuine contacts
between locals and tourists tend to be very limited. Rather) tourists encounter
mainly agents of the tourist industry (tour guides, hotel managers, souvenir
shopkeepers, etc.) (Cohen, 1984). A certain level of dialogue can occur during
these contacts; however, such dialogue is often either superficial or biased.
Tourism is indeed a business, where tourists have specific goals in mind (leisure
and cultural activities), and the professionals of the tourist industry are here to
please them, make them feel comfortable to spend their money, and make them
want to come back. In such cases, any confrontational form of dialogue would be
avoided, and in the dialogue itself, locals will try to please the tourists by telling
them what they want to hear. Such behavior tends to be self-reinforcing, as tourists
who travelled somewhere can easily declare themselves specialists on the country
they visited and confirm the pre-existing views of the country. Such occurrences
can easily be observed in many touristic places in Turkey, such as Sultanahmet in
Istanbul, Bodrum or Antalya. This phenomenon is interesting as it reveals a new
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aspect of the logic of appropriateness. In these cases) professionals of the tourism
industry in Turkey do the "appropriate thing:' Le. acquiesce to the discourse of
the tourist, not because it is true, or because it is ethically the right thing) but
because it is easier and more consensual to confirm their discourse) even if they
do not necessarily agree with it.
The Turkish government) especially through its Ministry of Culture and
Tourism) is aware of the necessity for the tourism industry to deliver to tourists the
discourse they want to hear, and its pernicious effects. For the last couple of years,
the Ministry has been broadcasting promotional films on Turkey) short clips of
dynamic and beautiful places in Turkey aimed at attracting more tourists.7 Many
debates have surrounded these otherwise rather successful video clips. One of the
main contention related to how ((Oriental" should the mood of the clips be. There
is indeed a dilemma for the producers of these clips whether to portray Turkey the
way tourists see it (a center of the Oriental mysteries) or the way Turkish people see
it (a mix of modernity and history, but not so Oriental). There is no easy answer to
this dilemma, but the very existence of the debate shows how serious this problem
is, and how the possibility of genuine dialogue through tourism is curtailed. Here
again, tourism offers a missed opportunity for dialogue.
In the four spaces identified-European Union) bilateral relationships,
immigration) and tourism-it seems consequently that the potential for dialogue
is not realized: missed dialogues are more pervasive than genuine dialogues.
There are structural conditions discouraging dialogue) oftentimes in the form of
a pernicious normative framework which disables dialogue by providing a pre-
determined discourse on what the right thing to do is.
Conclusions
So far) this paper might appear to portray a rather gloomy picture of the
state of dialogue between Turkey and Europe at different levels of analysis. In
the four spaces reviewed above-the European Union-Turkey institutional
relationship) the bilateral relationships) immigration) and tourism-
possibilities for genuine dialogue seem to be very weak. Overall, the failure
of the logic of arguing seems to be based on the pervasiveness of the logic
of appropriateness. The overall belief in the superiority of the European way
of life and know-how) more or less strong on both sides) leads only to the
possibility for Turkey to comply to the European model) without much room
for adjustments) contestation) and transformation of the European side. The
pervasiveness of the logic of appropriateness creates a situation where there is
dialogue) but not genuine dialogue; there are some transformative processes)
but only one possible direction for change. This situation raises questions
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regarding the possibility for dialogue in situations of unequal normative
powers) the origins of particular normative discourses) and the conditions
under which such situations can be rebalanced.
Furthermore) the above analysis is interesting at two levels. First) the
prevailing of the logic of appropriateness suggests) on the one hand) that the
logic of consequentialism or instrumental motives do not characterized most
of the Euro-Turkish relationship. Rather) people engaging in this interaction
are concerned about the normative content of the interaction and care about
mutual perceptions. Everyone is seeking the ccgood" as opposed to individual
interests. The fact that this understanding of the cCgood" is biased and rigid is a
core problem. But this problem seems to rest mainly at the subconscious level.
This raises both concerns and hopes as uncovering subconscious process is
a laborious task) but it shows that it is also possible to build on the goodwill
of well-intentioned people. European actors especially need to become more
aware of this situation. On the other hand) the weakness of the logic of arguing
demonstrates that) in practice) most ofthe interaction tends to remain superficial
or one-sided) and fails to address core and deep concerns. Such interactions
therefore constitute cCmissed dialogues:)
Another interesting finding is the role that Turkey)s middle position plays
in the efforts of dialogue and engaging in the logic of arguing. On one side) it
seems that Turkey)s middle position on different scales (geographical) cultural,
economic) etc.) is hurting Turkey)s position in dialogues. Given Turkey's in-
between identities and mixed interests) it is indeed difficult for Turkey to have a
strong) extreme stance on one topic. It is also difficult for Turkey to find strong
supporters within international public opinion. In a way) Turkey is not poor
enough to be pitied) not Western enough to be admired or desired, not exploited
enough to become a front for anti-imperialist movements, not secular enough
to be depicted as an icon of secularism) not Islamic enough to be supported
by Islamist movements) etc. As such the most motivated actors of the public
sphere do not have an easy hook to become strongly supportive on Turkey.
Alternatively however) being in the middle can allow Turkey to engage in
empathizing, in being able to understand both sides, and in building on two or
more existing· normative frameworks. If Turkey manages to articulate, in an
argumentative manner, the core dilemmas faced by today's globalized world,
faced by a world of conflicting civilizations (or the perceptions of it), Turkey's
role in the alliance of civilization could be colossal. It seems indeed that Turkey's
principal contribution to the European project lies in its ability to challenge it and
criticize it constructively. This is something difficult to achieve) given the structural
and normative impediments outlined above) but Turkey's greater awareness of
this role could help. What will be critical in this project will be to be able to use
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strong argument and language that can make sense from the perspective of one's
normative framework, while challenging it at the same time. This is a very needed
and challenging task, but one Turkey is very well positioned for.
Endnotes
1 With the exception ofsome particular subfields, such as "peace and conflict resolution.«
2 "La possibilite de penser, et de penser autremenf' [my translation].
3 Alternatively, Lynch defines ideal speech situation as "a shared lifeworld, some level of trust, a
willingness to set aside identities and power» (Lynch, 2006, p. 196).
4 For more details, refer to the official EU enlargment website: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
index_en.htm (last accessed August 31, 2009).
5 A full transcript of this speech can be found at: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/
article_7900_en.htm (last accessed August 31,2009).
6 See for instance an article on EU-Turkey «unidirectional" dialogue over Cyprus (www.euractiv.com/
en/enlargement/interview-eu-turkey-dialogue-key-cyprus-reunification/article-174661), or over Human
Rights values (www.re-public.gr/en/?p=441).
7 Such clips can be found on the website of the Ministry at www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/BelgeGoster.aspx?17
A16AE30572D31395FB1C5180B6EBD6A18E78EOAF5B93B4 (last accessed August 31,2009).
References
ED and Turkey: Constructive dialogue and a spirit ofcompromise are key for the accession process.
(2008). Retrieved November 2,2009, from
www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7900_en.htm.
Akagiil, D. & Vaner, S. (2005). EEurope avec ou sans la Turquie [Europe, with or without Turkey]. Paris:
Editions d'Organisation.
Borradori, G., Habermas, J. & Derrida, J. (2003). Philosophy in a time of terror: dialogues with Jilrgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Checkel, rT. (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International
Organization, 55(3), 553-588.
Cherif, M. & Derrida, J. (2006). L'islam et l'Occident : rencontre avec Jacques Derrida [Islam and the West:
Encounters with Jacques Derrida]. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Cohen, E. (1934). The sociology of tourism: Approaches, issues and findings. Annual Review ofSociology
10,373-392.
Diez, T., Agnantopoulos, A. & Kaliber, A. (2005). File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society. South
European Society & Politics, 10(1),1-15.
Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International
Organization, 52(4), 887-917.
Gadamer, H.G. (1979). Truth and method. London: Sheed and Ward.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory ofcommunicative action. Boston: Beacon Press.
Kaya, A. & Kentel, F. (2005). Euro-Turks a bridge or a breach between Turkey and the European Union?
Retrieved November 2, 2009 from http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-FRB/05)_Pictures,_
documents_and_external_sites/09)_Publications/%20KBS%E2%80%A2Belgian-Turks%20GB_
All%20in(1).pdf.
Kozak, M. & Tasci, A.D.A. (2005). Perceptions of Foreign Tourists by Local Service Providers: The Case of
Fethiye, Turkey. International Journal ofTourism Research, 7(4/5), 261-278.
Tolay 209
Lynch, M. (2000). The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres. Millennium - Journal of
International Studies, 29(2), 307-330.
Lynch, M. (2006). Dialogue in an Age of Terror. In M. Khan (Ed.), Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory,
Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 193-226). Oxford: Lexington Books.
March, J. & Olsen, J. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis ofpolitics. New York: Free
Press.
March, J. & Olsen, J. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International
Organization, 52(4), 943-969.
Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International
Organization, 42(3), 427-460.
Risse, T. (2000). «Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics. International Organization, 54(1),
1-39.
Schnapper, D. (1992). L'Europe des immigres : essai sur les politiques d'immigration [Immigrants' Europe:
Essays on Immigration Policies]. Paris: Editions F. Bourin.
S6nmez, S. & Sirakaya, E. (2002). A Distorted Destination Image? The Case of Turkey. Journal of Travel
Research, 41(2), 185-196.
Stivachtis, Y. (2008). Civilization and international society: the case of European Union expansion.
Contemporary Politics, 14(1), 71-89.
Todd, E. (1997). Le destin des immigres : Assimilation et segregation dans les democraties occidentales [The
fate of immigrants: assimilation and segregation in Western democracies]. Paris: Ed. du Seuil.
Vaner, S. (2005). La Turquie [Turkey]. Paris: Fayard; Centre d'etudes et de recherches internationales.
